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THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND TRAFFIC
STOPS: BRIGHT-LINE RULES IN
CONJUNCTION WITH THE TOTALITY OF
THE CIRCUMSTANCES TEST
Ohio v. Robinette, 117 S. Ct. 417 (1996)
I. INTRODUCTION
In Ohio v. Robinette,' the United States Supreme Court ad-
dressed whether a law enforcement officer must advise a de-
tained motorist that he is "free to go" before the motorist's
consent to search will be recognized as voluntary.2 The Court
held that the Fourth Amendment does not require the applica-
tion of any such bright-line rule, but rather is based on a fact-
specific reasonableness inquiry.3 In so deciding, the Court fur-
ther expanded the power of law enforcement officers to detain
motorists as defined in Whren v. United Statei4 and Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte.5 The Robinette Court held that the Ohio Supreme
Court's application of a bright-line rule, requiring police offi-
cers to inform detained motorists that they are "free to go" be-
fore a consent to search may be deemed voluntary, is unrealistic
and "thoroughly impractical."
6
This Note argues that, although the totality of the circum-
stances test is the appropriate test to apply to consensual officer-
pedestrian encounters, that test alone may not be adequate to
determine the legality of the officer's conduct in the instant
case.7 Therefore, the additional application of a bright-line rule
1117 S. Ct. 417 (1996).
2Id. at 421.
3 Id ChiefJustice Rehnquist defined the reasonableness inquiry as "measured in
objective terms by examining the totality of the circumstances." Id.
4 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996). In Whren, the Court held that an officer's subjective in-
tentions do not make continued detention of a motorist illegal, so long as an objec-
tive view of the totality of the circumstances justifies the detention. Id. at 1774.
' 412 U.S. 218 (1973). In Schneckloth, the Court rejected the application of a per se
rule regarding the officer-motorist encounter, holding that the voluntariness of a
consent to search is a question of fact to be determined with regard to all the circum-
stances. Id. at 248-49.
6 Robinette, 117 S. Ct. at 421 (quoting Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 231).
' See infra notes 163-72 and accompanying text.
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to the officer-motorist encounter is necessary to delineate the
constitutional boundaries of traffic stops and to check the sub-
stantial discretion afforded police officers in traffic detentions.8
This Note concludes that, in the wake of Ohio v. Robinette, indi-
vidual states should be encouraged to promulgate bright-line
rules similar to Ohio's "free to go" advisory rule, based on their
state constitutions, rather than on the Fourth Amendment of
the United States Constitution.9
II. BACKGROUND
A. ORIGINS AND APPLICATIONS OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution
provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be vio-
lated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the person or things to be seized."
The Fourth Amendment was adopted in response to the abusive
search and seizure practices used by the British government
during the American colonial period!' Accordingly, its enact-
ment guaranteed to each individual "[t]he security of one's pri-
vacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police." 2
In Wolf v. Colorado,'3 the Supreme Court held that the
Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the states.1 4 In Wolf,
'See infra notes 173-90 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 191-203 and accompanying text.
"U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
"See generally Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 311 (1978) (noting that the
Fourth Amendment was adopted in reaction to the "general warrants" used in Eng-
land, which allowed British officers to capriciously search colonial homes and work-
places for criminal evidence, seditious literature, or illegally imported goods); Frank
v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 363-65 (1959) (stating that "[t]he vivid memory by the
newly independent Americans of these abuses produced the Fourth Amendment as a
safeguard against such arbitrary official action by officers of the new Union").
12 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 453 (1971). For an excellent com-
mentary on the history of the Fourth Amendment, see WANE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SFzuzRE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT (3d ed. 1996).
"3 338 U.S. 25 (1949). In Wolf, the Court held that in a state court prosecution for
the state crime of conspiring to perform abortions, the Fourteenth Amendment does
not forbid the admission of evidence obtained by unreasonable search and seizure,
though the evidence would be inadmissible in a prosecution for violation of federal
law in a federal court because of a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 33.
" Id. at 27.
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the Court recognized that Fourth Amendment rights are "basic
to a free society" and, thus, are implicit in "the concept of or-
dered liberty."'5  Therefore, the Court held that the Fourth
Amendment applies to the states through the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 16 The Ohio counterpart
to the Fourth Amendment, which likewise secures an individ-
ual's right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures,
is found in Article I, § 14 of the Ohio Constitution. 7
As indicated by the wording of the Fourth Amendment and
mirrored by the language of the Ohio Constitution, "reason-
ableness" is the defining measure of the constitutionality of a
government search or seizure.' 8 Courts generally find that a
person has been "seized" within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment "only if, in view of all the circumstances surround-
ing the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that
he was not free to leave."' 9 The Supreme Court determines the
constitutionality of law enforcement practices by weighing the
practice's intrusion on a citizen's Fourth Amendment interests
against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests. 0
B. ENCOUNTERS BETWEEN POLICE OFFICERS AND PEDESTRIANS
Fourth Amendment interests are not triggered unless a
"search" or "seizure" has occurred. 2' But not every encounter
"5Ido
16 Id. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no
state shall "deprive a person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law...
U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV.
1 The Ohio Constitution states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and posses-
sions, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no
warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or thing to be
seized.
OHIO CONST. art. I., § 14.
18 Ohio v. Robinette, 117 S. Ct. 417, 421 (1996).
q United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980). See also Florida v. Bos-
tick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991); Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567 (1988); Florida v.
Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-55 (1979). The weighing of interests is the
"key principle" of the Fourth Amendment. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 700
n.12 (1981). The Fourth Amendment protects a citizen's "privacy, dignity, and secu-
rity" interests against "certain arbitrary and invasive acts by officers of the Govern-
ment or those acting at their direction." Skinner v. Railway Labor Exec. Ass'n, 489
U.S. 602, 613-14 (1989).
2' Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554.
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22between an officer and a pedestrian is a seizure. If a reason-
able person would "feel free to decline the officer's requests or
otherwise terminate the encounter," no seizure has occurred
and no reasonable suspicion is required to justify the officer's
conduct.23 For example, a police officer may approach a pedes-• 24
trian and ask questions; seek to examine a person's identifica-
tion or passport;25 pursue a pedestrian as he runs down the
street;26 and request to search a person's baggage.27  None of
these encounters triggers Fourth Amendment scrutiny so long
as "the police do not convey a message that compliance with
their requests is required.,28 These decisions reflect the Court's
philosophy that the typical police officer-pedestrian encounter
does not constitute a seizure where the pedestrians involved are
at liberty to come and go as they please.2
C. ENCOUNTERS BETWEEN POLICE OFFICERS AND MOTORISTS
In contrast to the officer-pedestrian encounter case law, the
Supreme Court has recognized that the objective intrusion,
authority of the police, and potential for abuse of discretionary
power in the context of the officer-motorist encounter raise dis-
tinct Fourth Amendment issues.0 For instance, the Supreme
22 Id. As the Court explained, "[t]here is nothing in the Constitution which pre-
vents a policeman from addressing questions to anyone on the streets." Id. at 553
(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 34 (1968) (WhiteJ., concurring)). See also Bostick,
501 U.S. at 434; Royer, 460 U.S. at 497.
23 Bostick, 501 U.S. at 436.
21 See INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984).
2See Bostick, 501 U.S. at 437; Delgado, 466 U.S. at 216; Royer, 460 U.S. at 501; Men-
denhall, 446 U.S. at 557-58.
2SeeMichigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 569 (1988).
27 See Bostick, 501 U.S. at 437; Royer 460 U.S. at 501.
Bostick 501 U.S. at 435 (emphasis added).
2' Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555. Given the great number and diversity of police offi-
cer-pedestrian encounters, the Supreme Court's test to distinguish consensual en-
counters from seizures is whether, "in view of all of the circumstances surrounding
the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was free to leave."
Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 573 (quoting Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554). Thus, a seizure oc-
curs at the point that a reasonable person would think he is not free to terminate a
conversation and walk away from the police. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554. Circum-
stances that "might indicate a seizure ... [include] the threatening presence of sev-
eral officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the
person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compli-
ance with the officer's request might be compelled." Id.
'0 See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979); United States v.
Briguoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 880-84 (1975) (holding that border patrol agents may
1998]
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Court stated in Delaware v. Prousd' that people are not stripped
of their Fourth Amendment rights "when they step from the
sidewalks into their automobiles."02  In Prouse, the Court held
that a discretionary spot-check by police officers to verify a mo-
torist's driver's license and registration was unconstitutional."
Although the Prouse Court recognized that the purpose of a traf-
fic stop is limited and the subsequent detention is brief, the
Court ruled that the act of stopping a vehicle and detaining its
occupants constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.34
1. Legality of a Traffic Stop Depends on Objective Standards
When considering challenges to police intrusions that occur
in the context of a motorist detention, the Court looks to the
reasonableness component of the Fourth Amendment.35 While
motorists enjoy significant interests in automobile travel which
are protected by the Fourth Amendment,3 6 a traffic stop lawfully
may be initiated based on an officer's articulable and reasonable
belief that a motorist is in violation of the traffic laws.
stop a vehicle near the border and question its occupants only if there is reason to
suspect that the car may contain illegal aliens).
s' 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
' Id. at 668. The Supreme Court remains mindful of the proscriptions contained
in the Fourth Amendment which "impose a standard of reasonableness upon the ex-
ercise of discretion by government officials" within the context of a traffic stop. Id. at
653-54.
Id. at 663.
I& at 653. See also Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 436 (1984) ("Certainly few
motorists would feel free either to disobey a directive to pull over or to leave the
scene of a traffic stop without being told they might do so.").
" See Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 880-84; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Tradi-
tionally, the reasonableness standard demands, "at a minimum," that intrusions by
the police "be capable of measurement against 'an objective standard.'" Prouse 440
U.S. at 654.
See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text. While acknowledging that a traffic
stop "significantly curtails" the "freedom of action" of a motorist, the Court has cau-
tioned that a motorist typically is not "completely at the mercy of the police." Berke-
met, 468 U.S. at 436-38.
37 Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663. The Supreme Court has held that such a traffic stop may
be initiated upon a showing of reasonable suspicion, based on specific and articulable
facts, to believe that an offense has been committed. Id. Moreover, the Court held
that where an officer has observed a traffic violation, the higher standard of probable
cause has been met. See, e.g., New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 117-18 (1986) (stop of
car for speeding and cracked windshield); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109
(1977) (stop of car bearing expired license tags).
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The law regarding an officer's intentions during traffic stops
developed from the Supreme Court's holding in Terry v. Ohio!"
Terry represented a departure from the Court's prior require-
ment that a police officer needed probable cause to suspect
criminal activity when detaining an individual. 9 The central
tenet of Tery provides that, "[in] justifying the particular intru-
sion the police officer must be able to point to specific and ar-
ticulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences
from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion."0 The Tery
Court employed a two-prong analysis to determine whether the
step was reasonable: (1) whether the police officer was justified
at the beginning of the stop; and (2) whether the officer's ac-
tions were reasonably related to the circumstances that trig-
gered the initial interference.'
Having thus established a framework for judging police be-
havior during traffic stops by objective criteria, the Supreme
Court thereafter consistently held that an officer's subjective in-
tentions do not invalidate reasonably-i.e., objectively-justifi-
able behavior under the Fourth Amendment.42 For example, in
United States v. Robinson,43 the Court held that a traffic-violation
arrest is not invalidated by the fact that it was "a mere pretext
for a narcotics search."" Five years later, the Court character-
ized Robinson as having established that an officer's actions are
legally justifiable, regardless of his state of mind, "as long as the
circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action." The
392 U.S. 1 (1968) (holding that a "stop" and "frisk" of two pedestrians on a street
comer was constitutional).
" See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 207-09 (1979) (noting that prior to Teny,
any restraint of a person amounting to a seizure was invalid unless justified by prob-
able cause). The majority in Teny recognized that some departure was necessary in
order to safeguard law enforcement personnel in carrying out their functions. See
Terry, 392 U.S. at 23-24.
40 Tery, 392 U.S. at 21.
"Id. at 19-20.
12 See infra text accompanying notes 43-52.
414 U.S. 218 (1973).
"Id. at 221 n.1. In Robinson, an officer stopped and arrested a motorist for driving
a car without a license. In the subsequent search, the officer found heroin in the mo-
torist's possession. Id. at 220-23.
' Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978). Scott, though not a traffic stop
case, involved the admission of wiretap evidence at trial despite the fact that the
agents conducting the tap had failed to make any effort to comply with the statutory
requirement that unauthorized acquisitions of evidence be minimized. Id. at 132.
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Court further expanded this concept in Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 46
holding that, under the Fourth Amendment, an officer may or-
der a motorist who has been validly stopped for a traffic viola-
tion to exit his vehicle.
Most recently, in Whren v. United States,48 the Court fore-
closed any argument that the "constitutional reasonableness of
traffic stops depends on the actual motivations of the individual
officers involved., 49 In VWren, the officers used traffic violations
as a pretext to stop a car and investigate possible narcotics of-
fenses.50 The police officers had neither probable cause nor
reasonable suspicion to detain the motorist for a drug search af-
ter the traffic stop.5 ' Therefore, within the context of an officer-
motorist encounter, the Whren Court explicitly stated that "sub-
jective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable cause
Fourth Amendment analysis.,
52
2. The Totality of the Circumstances Test Governs Determination of
Consensual Encounter vs. Seizure
A person is "seized" by the police within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment only if, in view of the "totality of the circum-
stance s53 surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would
have believed that he was not free to leave.54 Otherwise, any en-
46 434 U.S. 106 (1977).
Id. at 110-11. In Mimms, the Court held that the stop of a car bearing expired li-
cense tags met the higher standard of probable cause. This enabled an officer to ex-
ercise discretion to order a driver, validly stopped for a traffic violation, to exit his
vehicle even absent any particularized suspicion that the driver was presently armed
and dangerous. Id.
4' 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996).
4 Id. at 1774.
5' Id. at 1772. The officers temporarily detained the motorist, Brown, and his pas-
senger, Whren, for obstructing traffic and for failing to use a traffic signal when turn-
ing. Id.
"Id. Both the motorist and his passenger were young African-American males. Id.
" Id. For an excellent discussion of the implications of the Whren decision, see
David A. Harris, "Driving While Black" and All Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme Court
and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544 (1997). See also Craig M.
Glantz, Note, "Could" This Be the End of Fourth Amendment Protectionsfor Motorists ?, 87 J.
ClUM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 864 (1997).
5' See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973) (where the Court first
used this phrase in holding that, after stopping a motorist for a traffic violation, a po-
lice officer's search of the car was constitutional) (emphasis added).
" United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980). In Mendenhall the Court
held that the police officers' examination of a person's identification and travel
documents in an airport was constitutional. The Court noted that the ticket and
936 [Vol. 88
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counter between a police officer and a person is deemed con-
sensual .
Since its decision in United States v. Mendenhall the Court
has rejected efforts to replace the totality of the circumstances
test with bright-line rules based on the United States Constitu-
tion.5 6 In Forida v. Royer, the Court rejected the idea that a dis-
tinct dividing-line could be drawn between consensual
encounters and Fourth Amendment seizures. 5  The Court
stated:
We do not suggest that there is a litmus-paper test for distinguishing a
consensual encounter from a seizure or for determining when a seizure
exceed the bounds of an investigative stop .... [As] there will be endless
variations in the facts and circumstances, so much variation that it is unlikely
that the courts can reduce to a sentence or a paragraph a rule that will provide
unarguable answers .... 58
The Supreme Court also applied this reasoning in Michigan
v. Chesternut,59 reversing the Michigan Supreme Court's holding
that any investigatory pursuit of a motorist constitutes a Fourth
Amendment seizure.6 More recently, in Bostick, the Court re-
jected the Florida Supreme Court's presumption that every en-
counter between a police officer and a citizen occurring on a
bus is a seizure. 61 The Court held that if the reasonable person
would "feel free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise
terminate the encounter," no seizure has occurred and no rea-
identification were immediately returned, and the police officers were careful to ad-
vise the suspect that he could decline to be searched. Id. at 558-59.
5' Id. at 555.
6See, e.g., Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491
(1983); United States v. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
57 Royer, 460 U.S. at 506-07. The Court found that, similar to Mendenha/, the police
may approach a traveler and ask to see that person's identification and airline ticket.
Id. at 501.
Id. at 506-07 (emphasis added).
"486 U.S. 567, 574-76 (1988) (holding that a police chase of a pedestrian running
down the street is not a seizure because it "would not have communicated to the rea-
sonable person an attempt to capture or otherwise intrude upon [Chestemut's] free-
dom of movement").
o Id. at 570-72. The Court stated that "any assessment as to whether police con-
duct amounts to a seizure implicating the Fourth Amendment must take into account
'all of the circumstances surrounding the incident' in each individual case." Id. at
572 (quoting INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 215 (1984)).
"' Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991). The Court stated again that "a court
must consider all the circumstances surrounding the encounter" to determine what
constitutes a seizure. Id. at 439.
1998]
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sonable suspicion is required to justify the officer's conduct.62
Therefore, the Court concluded that whether a person has been
seized depends upon the totality of the circumstances surround-
ing the encounter.
Furthermore, in determining the validity of a consent to
search, the Supreme Court in Schneckloth refused to hold that
the giving of a cautionary warning is a defining characteristic of
a consensual encounter.6 The Court held that a consent search
was constitutional even though the police officer did not inform
a person of his right to refuse a search.6 The Court concluded
that "[w]hile knowledge of the right to refuse consent is one
factor to be taken into account, the government need not estab-
lish such knowledge as the sine qua non of an effective con-
sent."6
In sum, for the past three decades, the Supreme Court has
not countenanced the substitution of a bright-line rule for the
totality of the circumstances test in determining the constitu-
tionality of encounters between police officers and motorists.
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On August 3, 1992, Robert D. Robinette was stopped for
speeding in a construction zone on Interstate 70, just outside of
Dayton, Ohio.67 Deputy Roger Newsome of the Montgomery
County Sherifffs Office, who was on drug interdiction patrol at
the time, clocked Robinette driving his vehicle at sixty-nine-
miles-per-hour in a posted forty-five-mile-per-hour zone.6 New-
some acknowledged that the sole purpose for the stop was to is-
sue Robinette a warning for speeding.69 He did not suspect
12 Id. at 436.
Id. at 439-40.
6 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973) (holding that the police




67 Brief for Petitioner at 6, Ohio v. Robinette, 117 S. Ct. 417 (1996) (No. 95-891).
Robinette was accompanied by a passenger. Id.
State v. Robinette, 653 N.E.2d 695, 696 (Ohio 1995), rev'd, Ohio v. Robinette,
117 S. Ct. 417 (1996).
69 State v. Robinette, No. 14074, 1994 WL 147806, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 15,
1994), aff'd, Robinette, 653 N.E.2d at 696.
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Robinette of any other wrongdoing, 70 nor did he intend to issue
Robinette a speeding ticket.7'
Newsome approached Robinette's vehicle and asked for his
driver's license.7 2 Robinette complied with the deputy's request,
and Newsome returned to his patrol car to check the license
while Robinette remained seated in his vehicle.7 3 After deter-
mining that Robinette's license was valid, Newsome returned to
Robinette's vehicle and asked him to step out and to go to the
rear of his vehicle. 4 While Robinette stepped out of his car,
Newsome activated a video camera in his patrol car to record his
conversation with Robinette.7 - Newsome then handed Robi-
nette his license, and issued him a verbal warning for speeding. 6
Immediately thereafter Newsome asked Robinette, "One
question before you get gone: are you carrying any illegal con-
traband in your car? Any weapons of any kind, drugs, anything
like that?"7 7  When Robinette answered "no," Newsome re-
quested to search Robinette's vehicle.78 Robinette testified that
he was "shocked" at the question and "automatically" answered
"yes" to Newsome's request.9
Deputy Newsome's initial search of Robinette's vehicle
turned up a small quantity of marijuana.0 Newsome then
placed Robinette and his passenger in the back seat of the po-
lice car and told them that they were under investigative deten-
tion."' Newsome returned to the vehicle and continued his
search- of the vehicle.82  He eventually found a methamphet-





7' Brief for Respondent at 11, Ohio v. Robinette, 117 S. Ct. 417 (1996) (No. 95-
891).
7 ' Robinette, 653 N.E.2d at 696.
76 id.
' Id Newsome testified that he routinely asked permission to search the cars he
stopped for speeding violations as part of the drug interdiction process. Id.
7
" Brief for Respondent at 12-13, Robinette (No. 95-891).
79 Robinette 653 N.E.2d at 696. Robinette testified that he consented only because
he felt he had no choice but to comply with Deputy Newsome's request. Id.
" Brief for Respondent at 13, Robinette (No. 95-891).
81 Id.
82 Robinette, 653 N.E.2d at 696.
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amine (MDMA) pill in a plastic film container in the car8
Newsome then arrested Robinette.
On December 18, 1992, Robinette was indicted and charged
with possession of a controlled substance under Ohio Revised
Code § 2925.11(A)-felony drug abuse.85 On February 19,
1993, Robinette moved to suppress all evidence seized from his
vehicle, contending that it was obtained pursuant to an illegal
detention and search of his vehicle. The trial court denied
Robinette's motion, noting that Robinette's consent to the
search was free and voluntary and was not the product of duress
or coercion. The trial court considered the videotape to be
demonstrative evidence of Newsome's clear communication to
Robinette that the traffic matter had concluded before New-
some asked to search Robinette's vehicle. 8 Subsequently, Robi-
nette entered a plea of no contest, was found guilty, and was
sentenced accordingly.
89
Robinette appealed his conviction to the Ohio Court of Ap-
peals, contending that once he was given a warning for speeding
the justification for the stop no longer existed.90 Specifically,
Robinette argued that at the moment the purpose of the stop
was satisfied, there was no reason to suspect him or further de-
tain him.91 The State countered that Robinette was free to leave
and, therefore, there was no detention when he consented to
the search of his vehicle. 2
The appellate court reversed the trial court, concluding that
a "reasonable person in Robinette's position would not believe
that the investigative stop had been concluded, and that he or
she was free to go, so long as the police officer was continuing
to ask investigative questions.9 3  Accordingly, the search re-
" Brief for Respondent at 13, Robinette (No. 95-891).
84 Id.
85 Id. This statute states in part: "No person shall knowingly obtain, possess, or use
a controlled substance." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2925.11(A) (Anderson 1993).
" See State v. Robinette, No. 14074, 1994 WL 147806, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 15,
1994).
87 Id.
State v. Robinette, 653 N.E.2d 695, 696 (Ohio 1995).




"s Id. at *2.
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sulted from an illegal detention "and the fact that Robinette,
during the unlawful detention, may have consented to the
search is immaterial. 94
The State of Ohio appealed.95 Affirming the Court of Ap-
peals, the Ohio Supreme Court held that detaining Robinette
after issuing him the warning and returning his driver's license
was an illegal seizure. 6 In addition, the court recognized the
need to establish a clear demarcation between the end of a valid
seizure and the start of a consensual exchange. The court
ruled that a police officer must state that the justified stop is
over before seeking to engage in a consensual interrogation:
"Any attempt at consensual interrogation must be preceded by
the phrase 'At this time you legally are free to go' or by words of
similar import."98
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari
to determine: (1) ifjurisdiction existed to review the decision of
the Ohio Supreme Court, given that its decision relied in part
upon the Ohio Constitution; (2) whether a police officer's sub-
jective intentions make continued detention illegal when the
detention is otherwise justified by the totality of the circum-
stances; and (3) whether the Fourth Amendment requires that a
lawfully seized defendant be advised that he is "free to go" be-
fore his consent to a search will be recognized as free and vol-
untary.00
IV. SUMMARY OF OPINIONS
A. MAJORITY OPINION
Writing for the majority,'01 Chief Justice Rehnquist reversed
the Ohio Supreme Court.10 2 As a threshold matter, ChiefJustice
Rehnquist determined that the Court had jurisdiction to review
9" Id.
9' See State v. Robinette, 653 N.E.2d 697 (Ohio 1995).
Id. at 698.
97 d.
9' Id. at 699.
' Ohio v. Robinette, 116 S. Ct. 1040 (1996).
"® Ohio v. Robinette, 117 S. Ct. 417, 421 (1996).
"' In an 8-1 decision, Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and
Breyerjoined the ChiefJustice's opinion. Justice Ginsburg concurred in the opinion,
andJustice Stevens dissented.
"2 Robinette, 117 S. Ct. at 421.
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the decision of the Ohio Supreme Court because that court re-
lied almost exclusively on federal law, mentioning the Ohio
Constitution only in passing.'03 Next, Chief Justice Rehnquist
held that a police officer's subjective intentions do not make
continued detention of a person stopped for a traffic violation
illegal, so long as the detention is objectively justified by all of
the surrounding circumstances.' Finally, the Chief Justice ar-
gued that the Fourth Amendment does not require that a law-
fully seized defendant be advised explicitly that he is "free to go"
before his consent to a search of his vehicle qualifies as volun-
tary 105 ChiefJustice Rehnquist eschewed the application of any
bright-line rules and stated instead that the Fourth Amend-
ment's "'touchstone ... is reasonableness' . . . [which is] meas-
ured in objective terms by examining the totality of the
circumstances."'1°6
1. Subjective Intentions vs. Objective Circumstances
Chief Justice Rehnquist determined that Deputy Newsome's
subjective intentions did not make the continued detention of
Robinette illegal under the Fourth Amendment °7 The Chief
Justice relied primarily on the Court's contemporaneous deci-
sion in Whren v. United States for the proposition that:
[T] he fact that [an] officer does not have the state of mind which is hy-
pothecated by the reasons which provide the legaIjustification for the of-
ficer's action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the
circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.... Subjective inten-
tions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analy-
si 108
103 Id. at 420. ChiefJustice Rehnquist rejected Robinette's argument that the Ohio
Supreme Court's decision rested primarily upon the Ohio Constitution. Id. The
ChiefJustice cited Michigan v. Long for this proposition:
[When] a state court decision fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law, or to
be interwoven with the federal law, and when the adequacy and independence of
any possible state law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion, we will ac-
cept as the most reasonable explanation that the state court decided the way it
did because it believed that federal law required it to do so.
Id. (quoting Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983)).
104 Id. at 420-21.
'
5 Id. at 421.
'o6 Id. (quoting Florida v.Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991)).
11
7 Id. at 420.
"0' Id. at 420-21 (quoting Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1774 (1996))
(emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted).
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Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that "subjective thoughts
notwithstanding," Deputy Newsome was objectively justified in
asking Robinette to get out of his vehicle, in light of the admit-
ted probable cause to stop Robinette for speeding.1"
2. Bright-Line vs. Reasonableness Inquiry
The Chief Justice determined that the Court consistently
had rejected the use of bright-line rules in its Fourth Amend-
ment analysis, "instead emphasizing the fact-specific nature of
the reasonableness inquiry."110 Thus, the Court rejected the per
se rule of the Ohio Supreme Court in determining the validity of
a consent to search."' According to the Chief Justice, it would
be "unrealistic to require officers to always inform detainees
that they are free to go before a consent to a search may be
deemed voluntary."
2
Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that the Fourth
Amendment test for the voluntariness of a consent to search is
to be determined from the totality of the circumstances. Be-
cause the Supreme Court of Ohio held otherwise, its judgment
was reversed and the case was remanded for further proceed-
ings.14
B. JUSTICE GINSBURG'S CONCURRENCE
Justice Ginsburg wrote separately to emphasize her under-
standing of the Ohio Supreme Court's decision."5 According to
Justice Ginsburg, the Ohio Supreme Court contemplated its
bright-line rule to apply only as a "prophylactic measure" in the
State of Ohio, designed to reinforce the people's right to be
'0 Id. at 421 (citing Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 n.6 (1977)) ("We
hold ... that once a motor vehicle has been lawfully detained for a traffic violation,
the police officers may order the driver out of the vehicle without violating the
Fourth Amendment's proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures.").
11o Id.
111 Id.
' Id. (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227-31 (1973)). In Schneck-
loth, the Court stated that "[w]hile knowledge of the right to refuse consent is one
factor to be taken into account, the government need not establish such knowledge
as the sine qua non of an effective consent... [It] would be thoroughly impractical to
impose on the normal consent search the detailed requirements of an effective warn-
ing." Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227-31.
"'3 Robinette, 117 S. Ct. at 421.
114 Id.
Id. at 421-24 (Ginsburg,J., concurring).
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free from unreasonable searches and seizures within that state.116
She did not view the Ohio Supreme Court's decision as intend-
ing to impose a federal constitutional mandate on the nation as
a whole. Nevertheless, Justice Ginsburg concurred in the
Court's judgment because the Ohio Supreme Court appeared
to base its rule on the Federal Constitution, "thereby signal [ing]
it[s] view that the Nation's Constitution would require the rule
in all 50 States."'18
Justice Ginsburg acknowledged that a state may impose
greater restrictions on police activity than is required under
federal law."9 However, she pointed out that the Ohio Supreme
Court's reliance on state law rather than, or independent of,
federal law was unclear. 20 Therefore, the Ohio Supreme Court
should clarify on remand whether "its instructions to law en-
forcement officers in Ohio find adequate and independent
support" in the laws of the State of Ohio.
C. JUSTICE STEVENS' DISSENT
Justice Stevens would have affirmed the Ohio Supreme
Court because he believed it correctly held that Robinette's
consent to the search of his vehicle was the product of an unlaw-
122ful detention. Justice Stevens felt that several factors sup-
ported the Ohio court's conclusion that a reasonable person in
Robinette's position would have believed that he had an obliga-
tion to answer Deputy Newsome's questions and that he was not
free to leave the scene. 3 First, Justice Stevens cited as an exam-
ple the phrasing of Deputy Newsome's "one question," which
required an answer "before you get gone.1 24 Second, Justice
Stevens mentioned that Robinette was detained and had not re-
ceived any notice that he was free to go.1'5 Finally, Justice Stev-
ens stated that all of these factors, including the fact that
Robinette was standing in front of a video camera answering the
..1 Id. at 423 (Ginsburg,J., concurring).
17 Id. (Ginsburg,J., concurring).
11 Id. (Ginsburg,J., concurring).
. Id. at 422 (Ginsburg,J., concurring).
'20 Id. at 423 (Ginsburg,J., concurring).
12 Id. at 424 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
" Id- (Stevens,J., dissenting).
' Id. at 425 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
12 Id. (Stevens,J., dissenting).
" Id. (Stevens,J., dissenting).
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police officer's questions, "are all inconsistent with an assump-
tion that he could reasonably believe that he had no duty to re-
spond.' 26 Therefore, the Ohio Supreme Court and the Ohio
Court of Appeals were correct in presuming that a "continued
detention" was at issue.127
Furthermore, Justice Stevens believed, by the time Deputy
Newsome asked Robinette for consent to search his vehicle, the
lawful traffic stop had ended because Robinette had been issued
a warning. 2 8 Thus, the speeding violation provided no justifica-
don for continued detention.1'2 Moreover, there existed no ad-
ditional facts to trigger a reasonable suspicion of a separate
illegal activity to justify further detainment.3  As such, Justice
Stevens argued, Newsome's continued detention of Robinette
constituted an illegal seizure and the resultant consent to search
was invalid.'
Finally, Justice Stevens emphasized that nothing in the
United States Constitution prevents a state from requiring its
police officers to advise detained motorists as mandated by the
Ohio Supreme Court.3 2 Justice Stevens reiterated Justice Gins-
burg's point that the federal Constitution neither mandates nor
precludes a state from enforcing a warning rule and requiring
its police officers to advise its motorists that a traffic stop is
complete and they are "free to go." 33 Therefore, Justice Stevens
would have allowed the State of Ohio to enforce its warning rule
as a matter of Ohio law.13s
V. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court's decision in Ohio v. Robinette35 upsets
the balance of constitutional interests protected by the Fourth
Amendment.'m The Court's holding impermissibly expands the
r Id. (Stevens,J., dissenting).
"n Id. at 425-26 (Stevens,J, dissenting).
Id. at 426 (Stevens,J, dissenting).
Id. (StevensJ, dissenting).
Id. (Stevens,J, dissenting).
Id. at 427 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 507-08
(1983)).
"
2 Id. (Stevens,J., dissenting).
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
"s Id. at 428 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
' 117 S. Ct. 417 (1996).
" See supra text accompanying note 10 for the text of the Fourth Amendment.
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power of law enforcement officials and grants great discretion
to police officers in their interactions with motorists. In strictly
adhering to the totality of the circumstances test in police offi-
cer-citizen encounters, 7 the Court ignored the distinct Fourth
Amendment issues raised in the police officer-motorist context.
Moreover, by rejecting the application of any bright-line rules,'3
the Court unfairly tipped the balance of Fourth Amendment in-
terests in favor of the police officer during q traffic stop.
Because of the nature of the intrusions, risks, and interests
involved for both the police officer and the motorist during a
traffic stop, advisory warning rules should be applied in con-
junction with objective tests to control motorist seizures.' 9 As
both Justices Ginsburg40 and Stevens acknowledged, 4 ' the Ohio
Supreme Court's "free to leave" rule, as based on the Ohio Con-
stitution, is an appropriate rule to draw the constitutional line
between consensual police officer-motorist encounters and un-
lawful detentions.
A. THE COURT INCORRECTLY EQUATED PEDESTRIAN ENCOUNTERS
WITH MOTORIST SEIZURES
In its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the Supreme
Court has recognized that "[s] treet encounters between citizens
and police officers are incredibly rich in diversity."42  In Robi-
nette, however, the Court ignored this "diversity" and treated a
situation in which a motorist was stopped for a traffic violation
no differently than an encounter between a police officer and a
W Robinette 117 S. Ct. at 421.
1'Id.
One Ohio appellate court, reviewing the testimony of Deputy Newsome and
other police officers that described how and why the officers request consent to
search the vehicles of motorists stopped for routine traffic violations, stated candidly:
What is obviously troubling about these cases is that hundreds, and per-
haps thousands of Ohio citizens are being routinely delayed in their travels and
asked to relinquish to uniformed police officers their right to privacy in their
automobiles and luggage, sometimes for no better reason than to provide an of-
ficer the opportunity to "practice" his drug interdiction technique.
While we recognize the importance of drug interdiction, we are shocked
by what we believe to be an unjustified and egregious intrusion upon the privacy
rights of the citizens of Ohio.
State v. Retherford, 639 N.E.2d 498, 503-04 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (footnote omitted).
", Robinette 117 S. Ct. at 421-24 (Ginsburg,J., concurring).
141 Id. at 424-28 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
112 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968).
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pedestrian. The particular status of the individual as a motor-
ist or a pedestrian is crucial under Fourth Amendment juris-
prudence. The Supreme Court has ruled that the typical police
officer-pedestrian encounter does not constitute a seizure under
the Fourth Amendment,14 4 while stopping a vehicle and detain-
ing its occupants is a Fourth Amendment seizure."
There are sound reasons why pedestrian encounters and
motorist seizures raise distinct and different Fourth Amend-
ment issues. When a person is approached by a police officer
inside an airport terminal,14 6 on the street,47 or while sitting on a
bus, the law operates on the assumption that the person re-
mains free to leave and may ignore the officer.4 9  The typical
police officer-pedestrian encounter as such is a balanced meet-
ing where the officer is free to question the pedestrian, but the
pedestrian also is free to walk away from the officer.'50
In contrast, a motorist stopped by a police officer is not in a
position to ignore the police officer or his questions. Once a
traffic stop has occurred, "[c]ertainly few motorists would feel
free.., to leave the scene ... without being told they might do
so."'51 The encounter is no longer balanced: the police officer
'4 Robinette, 117 S. Ct. at 421. The three cases cited by ChiefJustice Rehnquist in
support of the totality of the circumstances test involved pedestrian encounters rather
than motorist seizures. Id. (citing Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991) (passengers
on bus); Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567 (1988) (confrontation in airport);
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983) (passengers on bus)).
,4 See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980). See also supra notes
18-20 and accompanying text.
"' SeeMichigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450 (1990) (holding that
when a motorist is stopped at a sobriety checkpoint, a seizure has occurred); Dela-
ware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979) (finding that when a motorist is stopped for
a discretionary spot-check of his or her driver's license and registration, a seizure has
occurred); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556 (1976) (noting that
when a motorist is stopped at an official checkpoint, a seizure has occurred). See su-
pra notes 21-34 and accompanying text.
146 See Royer, 460 U.S. at 501; see also supra notes 25, 27 and accompanying text.
'
4 7 See Chesternu, 486 U.S. at 576; see also supra note 26 and accompanying text.
148 See Bostick, 501 U.S. at 437; see also supra notes 25, 29 and accompanying text.
14' Bostick, 501 U.S. at 435-36. See also Chesternu 486 U.S. at 575 (holding that a po-
lice chase is not a seizure because it "would not have communicated to the reasonable
person an attempt to capture or otherwise intrude upon [Chesternut's] freedom of
movement").
50 See supra notes 27, 29. Roye; Chesternut and Bostick are examples of balanced
meetings between police officers and pedestrians.
15, Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 436 (1984). In Berkere, the Court found
that the motor vehicle stop was a seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Id.
at 435-37 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979)). Though police of-
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dictates the pace and circumstances of the confrontation and
the motorist is faced with a climate of "substantial anxiety."152
Hence, unlike a pedestrian who may refuse to answer a police
officer's questions, a motorist detained by a police officer is
more like a person confronted in his home, i.e., he is not in a
position to know the lawful limits of the officer's conduct or the
extent of his own right to leave or terminate the seizure. 5 -
In his application of the totality of the circumstances test
and rejection of any bright-line rules, Chief Justice Rehnquist
disregarded the differences between a police officer-pedestrian
encounter and a police officer-motorist seizure. Despite the
Chief Justice's assertion that the totality of the circumstances
test may encompass an "endless variation of facts and circum-
stances," 54 that test alone is inapt because it is designed to assess
the perspective of pedestrians who are at liberty to come and go
as they please. 5
Chief Justice Rehnquist ignored the fact that a police offi-
cer-motorist seizure is not an "arm's length" meeting.5 6 Rather,
a traffic stop significantly interrupts a motorist's "freedom of
movement" and is completely controlled by the discretion of the
police officer. 57 Nevertheless, the Court adopted a mechanical
approach in Robinette-ignoring the particular facts of this po-
lice officer-motorist seizure in an effort to fit every police offi-
cer-citizen encounter within the confines of the totality of the
circumstances test.
ficers are permitted to stop and question a motorist, that right is limited: they must
have a reasonable and articulable reason for doing so. Id.
.5. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 657 (1979).
"" See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532 (1967) (noting that a resident
confronted with an official housing inspector demanding a warrantless entry has "no
way of knowing the lawful limits of the inspector's power to search").
's Ohio v. Robinette, 117 S. Ct. 417, 421 (1996) (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S.
491, 506 (1983)).
255 See Prouse, 440 U.S. at 659-61 (finding that because "[viehicle stops for traffic
violations occur countless times each day," and every motorist is subject to a "multi-
tude of applicable traffic and equipment regulations"---rules which are not applicable
to pedestrians-police officers have substantial discretion in deciding which motorists
to stop and how to resolve each of those stops).
'56 An "arm's length" meeting is a police officer-citizen encounter which does not
restrict the citizen's "freedom of movement." Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567,
575 (1988).
157 Prouse, 440 U.S. at 657.
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By contrast, Justice Stevens' dissent correctly took these dif-
ferences into account. Justice Stevens agreed with the majority
that the initial stop of Robinette for a speeding violation was jus-
tifiable.158 However, Deputy Newsome's subsequent actions in
removing Robinette from his vehicle, inquiring about illegal
contraband, and requesting to search Robinette's vehicle consti-
tuted an illegal seizure because of the unique power of police
officers and powerlessness of motorists during a traffic stop.159
Deputy Newsome's unique power is evident because the
motorist in Robinette, unlike the pedestrians in Bostick, Royer, and
Chesternut, was not in a position to ignore the officer or his ques-
tions.' Unlike those pedestrian encounters, the officer in Robi-
nette had complete discretion to dictate the pace and
circumstances of the motorist seizure.61 Moreover, the motorist
in Robinette was awaiting the outcome of the traffic stop with
"substantial anxiety" in an atmosphere of fear and distress. 6
The Court, however, ignored these disparities between the typi-
cal police officer-pedestrian encounter and the unbalanced po-
lice officer-motorist seizure.
B. THE INADEQUACY OF THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES
TEST
In its haste to apply the totality of the circumstances test, the
Robinette Court also ignored relevant facts about the purportedly
consensual encounter between Deputy Newsome and Robi-
nette. 5 Indeed, the Court failed to describe any of the facts of
the case when applying its totality of the circumstances test.
61
Only Justice Stevens acknowledged that the circumstances sup-
ported the Ohio Supreme Court's conclusion that "a reasonable
' Ohio v. Robinette, 117 S. Ct. 417,425 (1996) (StevensJ, dissenting).
,
29 Id. at 426-27 (StevensJ, dissenting).
'6 See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 436 (1984).
161 See Robinette, 117 S. Ct. at 425 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556-59 (1976) (noting that because all motorists ap-
proaching a sobriety checkpoint were stopped, the seizure did not afford the police
the unchecked discretion inherent in the random stops that were at issue later in
Prouse); LAFAVE, supra note 12, § 10.8(d), at 696 (a central theme of Martinez-Fuerte is
that "a police procedure is less threatening to Fourth Amendment values when the
discretionary authority of the police (and thus the risk of arbitrary action) is kept at a
minimum").
112 Prous 440 U.S. at 657.
'63 See Robinette, 117 S. Ct. at 419-21.
' See id. at 421.
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motorist" in Robinette's shoes would not have felt free to leave
without answering Newsome's questions and without ultimately
allowing Newsome's search of his vehicle.'65
Robinette, who may have believed that he was free to leave
when Deputy Newsome issued him a warning and returned his
license, was suddenly confronted with-and what Deputy New-
some framed as-a "routine" question and a "routine" request
to search his vehicle.l'r Thereafter, the deputy seized upon
Robinette's momentary illusion of freedom to justify what sub-
sequently occurred as a consensual encounter. 1 7 Nevertheless,
it is clear that Deputy Newsome retained complete authority
and discretion over Robinette throughout the seizure.6 5
Despite these relevant facts, Chief Justice Rehnquist argued
that the totality of the circumstances test is adequate for any fac-
tual inquiry implicating the Fourth Amendment, including the
inquiry in Robinette.69 However, as Justice Stevens' analysis con-
firms, this test alone is inadequate when examining the police of-
ficer-motorist seizure.170 Although Robinette's "consent" to
Deputy Newsome's search was not unreasonable based on the
totality of the circumstances, it nonetheless constituted no more
than a submission to the police officer's greater authority.
7 1
Unlike the typical police officer-pedestrian encounter, the po-
lice officer-motorist encounter involves much greater police dis-
cretion and much less motorist freedom.'72 Therefore, the
police officer-motorist encounter must be controlled by some-
thing more than the totality of the circumstances test.
5Id. at 425 (StevensJ, dissenting). For a discussion of the circumstances consid-
ered by Justice Stevens and the Ohio Supreme Court, see supra text accompanying
notes 123-28.
'6 State v. Robinette, 653 N.E.2d 695, 696 (Ohio 1995), rev'd, Ohio v. Robinette,
117 S. Ct. 417 (1996).
67 Id. at 698.
16 id.
169 Robinette, 117 S. Ct. at 421.
170 See id. at 424-25.
171 Consent based on a submission to an officer's authority is insufficient as a mat-
ter of law to constitute an unequivocal and freely given consent. See Bumper v. North
Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 550 (1968); LAFAVE, supra note 12, § 9.3(a), at 112 ("Given
the fact that (a motorist] quite clearly had been seized when his car was pulled over,
the return of [his license] hardly manifests a change in status when it was immedi-
ately followed by interrogation concerning other criminal activity.").
'" See, e.g., Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984); United States v. Menden-
hall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
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C. BRIGHT-LINE RULES AND MOTORIST SEIZURES
The United States Supreme Court's cursory rejection of the
Ohio Supreme Court's establishment of a bright-line rule was
similarly misguided.'7 3 Due to the unique nature of the police
officer-motorist encounter, the Court should have supported
clear rule-making as an additional balancing factor in the
Fourth Amendment analysis. 74
The Ohio Supreme Court's requirement that a police offi-
cer advise a motorist that he is "free to leave" before a consent
to search is valid is neither a single-factor test nor an all-or-
nothing proposition of law.175 Most important, the police offi-
cer's advice to the motorist that he is "free to go" was not de-
signed to supplant the totality of the circumstances test of
Schneckloth76 with a single bright-line rule for assessing the vol-
untariness of consent.
7 7
In addition, unlike the cases cited by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, 7 Robinette involved a lawful seizure followed by a
seamless transition to a search unrelated to the purpose of the
seizure.'7 By demarcating a detention from a subsequent con-
'" To delineate between the conclusion of a valid seizure and the commencement
of a consensual exchange in the context of a traffic stop, the Ohio Supreme Court
required a police officer to inform a motorist "at this time you legally are free to go"
or "words of similar import." Robinette, 653 N.E.2d at 699.
'7' See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 277 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing) (arguing that citizens cannot "meaningfully be said to have waived something as
precious as a constitutional guarantee without ever being aware of its existence"). For
a full discussion of bright-line Fourth Amendment rules, see Albert W. Alschuler,
Bright Line Fever and the Fourth Amendmen4 45 U. Prrr. L. REV. 227 (1984).
' See Robinette, 653 N.E.2d at 698-99. This is to be contrasted with the cases in
which bright-line rules established by states were all-or-nothing propositions of law.
See Robinette, 117 S. Ct. at 421 (citing Bostick and Chesternut). For example, in F/orida v.
Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439-40 (1991), the Court struck down the holding of the Florida
Supreme Court that all bus searches were unconstitutional seizures under the Fourth
Amendment. In Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 569 (1988), the Court struck
down a Michigan Court of Appeal's holding that all "investigatory pursuits" were sei-
zures for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.
'7' 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
'77 The Ohio Supreme Court noted the importance of consensual encounters as a
"constitutional, investigative tool." Robinette, 653 N.E.2d at 699 (citing Florida v. Bos-
tick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991)).
'78 The Chief Justice cited Bostick, Royer, and Chesternut--all police officer-
pedestrian encounters. See Ohio v. Robinette, 117 S. Ct. 417, 421 (1996).
' See Robinette, 653 N.E.2d at 698. The underlying rationale for the "free to go"
rule was expressed by the Ohio Supreme Court as follows:
The transition between detention and a consensual exchange can be so seamless
that the untrained eye may not notice that it has occurred. The undetectability
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sensual exchange, the imposition of an advisory requirement on
police officers does nothing more than ensure that motorists,
who are routinely confronted with requests to search their vehi-
cles, are free from unreasonable searches and seizures.18 Thus,
the advisory requirement comports with the Fourth Amend-
ment criteria advanced by the Supreme Court in its analysis of
all police officer-citizen encounters.""
Furthermore, the Court's claim that the advisory require-
ment is "unrealistic" is groundless.8 2 The rule imposed by the
Ohio Supreme Court is quite simple; an officer should inform
the motorist that "at this time you legally are free to go. '8 3 Con-
trary to ChiefJustice Rehnquist's opinion in Robinette, this rule is
not "unrealistic;" the Fourth Amendment was designed to pro-
tect the rights of "the people," not the rights of law enforcement
officials. 8 4 Moreover, as argued by the dissent in Florida v. Bos-
of that transition may be used by police officers to coerce citizens into answering
questions that they need not answer, or to allow a search of a vehicle that they
are not legally obligated to allow.... Most people believe that they are validly in
a police officer's custody as long as the officer continues to interrogate them.
The police officer retains the upper hand and the accouterments of authority.
That the officer lacks legal license to continue to detain them is unknown to
most citizens, and a reasonable person would not feel free to walk away as the of-
ficer continues to address him.
Id.
Igo Id. at 698-99. As recognized by Justices Ginsburg and Stevens, the Ohio Su-
preme Court's ruling was a pragmatic response to a routine procedure used by police
officers in Ohio and throughout the country-broadening the scope of valid deten-
tions for traffic stops so that every traffic stop becomes a search for illegal contraband.
See Robinette, 117 S. Ct. at 421-22 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); id. at 424-25 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
'8' See, e.g., Florida v.Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 249 (1991) (officer asked permission to
search Jimeno's vehicle and informed him that he did not have to consent to a
search); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 548 (1980) (officers were careful
to advise the suspect that she had the right to decline to be searched). It is important
to note that Ohio's advisory requirement does not prevent an officer from obtaining
the motorist's consent to search his vehicle. The advice does clarify for the citizen
that the detention has ended by making the motorist aware that he is free to leave
and does not have to endure further questioning by the police officer. Robinette, 653
N.E.2d at 698-99.
112 The Supreme Court, citing Schneckloth, stated that it would be "unrealistic" to
require police officers to advise motorists that they are free to go before a consent to
search is valid. Robinette 117 S. Ct. at 421 (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
218, 227 (1973) ("[it] would be thoroughly impractical to impose on the normal con-
sent search the detailed requirements of an effective warning")).
,83 Robinette, 653 N.E.2d at 699.
184 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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tick, "the effectiveness of a law-enforcement technique is not
proof of its constitutionality."t
As Justice Ginsburg alone recognized, the use of the "free to
go" advisory warning was "crafted by the Ohio Supreme Court
to reduce the number of violations of textually guaranteed
rights."'86 Most motorists are unable either to enumerate their
constitutional rights or to state the parameters of those rights.
8 7
The Fourth Amendment and its counterpart under the Ohio
Constitution are designed to protect the people against arbi-
trary intrusions, not vice versa.'t Whereas the Ohio Supreme
Court's bright-line rule greatly clarifies the parameters of a mo-
torist's right-following detention for a traffic violation-to be
free of unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth
Amendment, t the Robinette ruling merely flips the purpose of
that amendment by forcing the motorist to protect his own
rights.'19
D. HOW THE STATE OF OHIO SHOULD PROCEED TO IMPLEMENT
ITS BRIGHT-LINE RULE
As the Supreme Court noted in Robinette, the Ohio Supreme
Court premised its holding upon both the Fourth Amendment
and Article I, § 14, of the Ohio Constitution.'9 1 However, asJus-
tice Ginsburg noted, the Ohio Supreme Court's opinion con-
tained some "ambiguity regarding the federal- or state-law basis"
"" 501 U.S. 429, 440 (1991) (Marshall,J., dissenting).
" Robinette, 117 S. Ct. at 423 (Ginsburg,J., concurring).
,87 Depending on his level of sophistication, a motorist might be placed in a posi-
tion of compromise. One motorist might simply decline to consent to a police search
and take the risk that he will walk away with no further action taken by the officer.
Another motorist, however, might be placed in the position of waiving Fourth
Amendment rights, of which he might well be unaware. See, e.g., Berkemer v.
McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 436 (1984) (noting while discussing Fourth Amendment
rights that a detained individual is unlikely to feel free to ignore an officer and "leave
the scene of a traffic stop without being told [he] might do so").
' SeeU.S. CoNsT. amend. IV; 01o CONsT. art. I., § 14.
189 Robinette, 653 N.E.2d.at 698.
" See Tracey Maclin, The Decline of the Right of Locomotion: The Fourth Amendment on
the Streets, 75 CoRNELL L. REv. 1258, 1300-01 (1990) (arguing that, "in the real world,"
the burden of protecting one's Fourth Amendment rights has been shifted to the in-
dividual and that it is unrealistic to assume that an individual-when detained by a
police officer-will feel free to ignore the officer and walk away).
191 Robinette, 117 S. Ct. at 420.
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for its decision. 9 2 Thus, she emphasized that it is "incumbent"
upon the state court to be clear about its "ultimate reliance on
state law" when announcing a new legal rule.9 3
The Supreme Court has repeatedly advised state courts that
they may construe their own constitutions to provide broader
individual liberties than those provided under the federal con-
stitution.94 Likewise, the Court has advised state courts that
they may "construe their own constitutions as imposing more
stringent constraints on police conduct than does the Federal
Constitution."19 The Ohio Supreme Court has also recognized
this premise in the context of individual rights,' 96 and the advi-
sory "free to leave" requirement imposed by that court in Robi-
nette97 does nothing more than provide greater protection to
the Ohio motorist pursuant to Ohio's state constitution.
The issue addressed by the Ohio Supreme Court, and seem-
ingly overlooked by Chief Justice Rehnquist, was how best to
protect the right of motorists in Ohio to be free from unreason-
able searches when the search follows an initial detention for a
traffic violation.' 98 As Justice Ginsburg noted, the Ohio Su-
'92 Id. at 423 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (discussing Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S.
1032, 104042 (1983)).
"' Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring). In his dissent, Justice Stevens also highlighted
the point that the Supreme Court's decision did not address the "validity of that rule
as a matter of Ohio law." Id. at 427 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
'" See, e.g., City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 293 (1982) (not-
ing that "a state court is entirely free to read its own State's constitutions more
broadly than this Court reads the Federal Constitution. . ."). For a comprehensive
analysis of state constitutional protections, see Barry Latzer, Toward the Decentralization
of Criminal Procedure: State Constitutibnal Law and Selective Disincorporation, 87 J. CRim. L.
& CRIINoLoGY63 (1996).
'9' California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 43 (1988); see also Michigan v. Long, 463
U.S. 1032, 1068 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that a state may provide
"greater protection to one of its citizens than some other State might provide or...
than [the Supreme] Court might require throughout the country").
'96 See Arnold v. City of Cleveland, 616 N.E.2d 163 (Ohio 1993). The Ohio Su-
preme Court concluded:
The Ohio Constitution is a document of independent force. In the areas of indi-
vidual rights and civil liberties, the United States Constitution, where applicable
to the states, provides a floor below which state court decisions may not fall. As
long as state courts provide at least as much protection as the United States Su-
preme Court has provided in its interpretation of the federal Bill of Rights, state
courts are unrestricted in according greater civil liberties and protections to in-
dividuals and groups.
Id. at 164.
,17 653 N.E.2d 695, 699 (Ohio 1995).
'. Compare id. at 697-99, with Ohio v. Robinette, 117 S. Ct. 417, 419-21 (1996).
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preme Court was fully aware of the widespread practice in Ohio
of police officers seeking consent to search without legal basis
during the course of a routine traffic stop.19 The determination
of the Ohio Supreme Court was that the motorist is best pro-
tected by being informed; thus it imposed a requirement on po-
lice officers to advise a motorist, at the conclusion of a traffic
stop, that the motorist is legally free to leave."
The Ohio Supreme Court could have interpreted the Ohio
Constitution to provide adequate and independent state
grounds for the Robinette bright-line rule.201 Had the Ohio Su-
preme Court, as Justice Ginsburg 2 and Justice Stevens sug-
gested,203 clearly based its decision on Ohio law, then it no doubt
would have been empowered to interpret its own constitution to
overprotect the fundamental right of Ohio motorists to be free
of unreasonable searches and seizures.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Ohio v. Robinette, the Supreme Court held that the Fourth
Amendment does not require the application of a bright-line
advisory warning to delineate between a consensual encounter
and an unlawful detention in the police officer-motorist con-
text. The Court determined that the totality of the circum-
stances test alone is adequate to control any police officer-citizen
encounter. In so deciding, the Court ignored the distinct
Fourth Amendment issues raised in the police officer-motorist
context and unjustly tilted the balance of constitutional interests
during a traffic stop in favor of the police officer. Because of
the nature of the intrusions, risks, and interests involved for
both the police officer and the motorist, the Court should have
applied the Ohio Supreme Court's "free to leave" advisory warn-
ing in conjunction with its objective test to control motorist sei-
zures. Nevertheless, given that the Supreme Court consistently
has rejected the application of any bright-line rules based on the
"9 Robinette, 117 S. Ct. at 422 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (emphasizing that Deputy
Newsome testified in Robinette's case that he "routinely requested permission to
search automobiles he stopped for traffic violations," and that in another prosecution
Newsome acknowledged that he "requested consent to search in 786 traffic stops in
1992, the year of Robinette's arrest").
2W Robinette, 653 N.E.2d at 699.
2' See supra notes 194-97 and accompanying text.
"2 See Robinette, 117 S. Ct. at 422-24 (GinsburgJ., concurring).
Id. at 427-28 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
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Fourth Amendment, in the future the Ohio Supreme Court
should clearly base its decision on state law when determining
how best to protect the rights of its motorists.
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